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An Anatomy of False Analysis: Original Intent 
Raoul Berger' 
Paul Brest's "The Intentions of the Adopters Are in the 
Eyes of the Beholder"' is replete with bare assertions 
untainted by historical facts. Brest is a perfervid activist2 who 
earlier opined that "whatever the Framers' expectations may 
have been, broad constitutional guarantees require the Court to 
discern, articulate, and apply values that are widely and deeply 
held by our societ~."~ Thereby he imputed to  the Founders the 
employment of guarantees to  defeat their own   expectation^!"^ 
More boldly, he challenged the assumption that Tudges and 
other public officials were bound by the text or original 
understanding of the Constitution." However, Chief Justice 
Marshall asked, "Why does a judge swear to  discharge his 
duties agreeably to  the Constitution . . . if that Constitution 
* A.B., 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D., 1935, Northwestern University; 
LLM., 1938, Harvard University. Honorary degrees from University of Cincinnati, 
University of Michigan, and Northwestern University. 
1. Paul Brest, The Intentions of the Adopters Are in the Eyes of the Beholder, 
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 17
(Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Brest I]. 
2. Thus he labelled me a "racist" because I concluded that desegregation ran 
counter to the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brest, i n h  
note 3, at 10. An array of commentators, including Brest himself, ir$ra text 
accompanying note 23, agree that segregation was left in place, infm: note 22. 
3. Paul Brest, Berger u. Brown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1977, at  10, 44. Do the 
Court's death penalty decisions, for example, reflect "widely" held views of our 
society? Learned Hand wrote, "[the judge] has no right to divinations of public 
opinion which run counter to its last formal expressions." LEARNED HAND, THE 
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 14 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). 
4. "One portion of a statute should not be construed to annul or destroy 
what has clearly been granted by another." Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (17 How.) 
612, 623 (1849). So too, Judge Cardozo stated, "No sensible reason can be imagined 
why the State, having consented to be sued, should thus paralyze the remedy." 
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554 (1951) (citations omitted). 
Similarly, once the "expectations" of the Framers are recognized, they cannot be 
defeated by the Framers' "guarantees." 
5. Paul Brest, The Misconceived @est for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204, 224 (1980) [hereinafter Brest 111. 
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forms no rule for his government?" He declared that ours is a 
government of limited powers, and that those limits were 
"committed to  writing" so that they may not '%e passed by 
those intended to be re~trained."~ Brest also challenged the 
"authority of the Constitution" because it "derives from the 
consent of its adopters*; but they are "dead and gone" and 
"their consent cannot bind succeeding generations." Judges 
are creatures of the Constitution and may exercise only such 
powers as it confers. If it is not binding on the judges, who 
have sworn to support it, whence do they derive their power? 
And why are we bound by their decisions? 
Brest answers, adopting a suggestion of Owen Fiss, that 
the 'legitimacy" of the courts "depends not on the consent . . . 
of the people, but rather on their special competence, on the 
special contribution they make to the quality of our social life," 
and which, apparently, the judges themselves are t o  
determine.g The special "competence" of judges to solve the 
staggering social and economic problems that confront our 
society is, to  say the least, debatable. Fiss advances a 
remarkable justification: 
Ijudgesl are lawyers, but in terms of personal characteristics 
they are no different from successful businessmen or 
politicians. Their capacity to make a special contribution to 
our social life derives not from any personal traits or 
knowledge . . . but fiom the definition of the office in which 
they find themselves and through which they exercise 
power.1° 
Thus one becomes competent upon taking office! But a seasoned 
judge, Clifford Wallace, observed, "I do not believe that one 
gains added wisdom or a keener perception of social value 
merely by becoming a judge."" Speaking by Justice Jackson, 
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
7. Id. at 176. 
8. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 225. Compare Herbert J. Storing's refusal to 
"adopt the current cant that the fundamental law is shapeless stuff to be formed 
at will by future generations." 1 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI- 
FEDERALI~ 3 (1981). 
9. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 226 (quoting Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 
1978 Term-Forword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979) 
(emphasis omitted)). 
10. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
99 (1982) (emphasis added). 
11. CMord Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the 
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the Court disclaimed power based upon its "competence": "Nor 
does our duty to  apply the Bill of Rights to  assertions of official 
authority depend upon our possession of marked competence in 
the field. . . . But we act in those matters not by authority of 
our competence but by force of our ~ornmissions."~~ Brest 
acknowledges that the judiciary has assumed a major role in 
protecting "individual rights and decision making through 
democratic pro~esses."'~ 
Because the great bulk of constitutional litigation currently 
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, I shall focus on the 
framers' indubitable intention to  exclude suffrage from its 
scope. Let us test Brest's unqualified assertion that original 
intention resides only in the eyes of the beholder. Section two 
of the Amendment provides that if s&age is denied on 
account of race, the state's representation in the House of 
Representatives shall be proportionately reduced.14 Senator 
William Fessenden, chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction, stated that this 'leaves the power where it is 
but tells [the States] most distinctly, if you exercise the power 
wrongfully, such and such consequences will foll~w."'~ Senator 
Jacob Howard, to  whom it fell to  explain the Amendment 
because of Fessenden's illness, said, "the theory of this whole 
amendment is, to leave the power of regulating . . . suffrage 
with the States, and not to  assume to  regulate it by any clause 
of the Constit~tion."'~ So too, the Report of the Joint 
Committee, which drafted the Amendment, stated, "It was 
doubtfiil . . . whether the States would consent to  surrender a 
power they had always exercised, and to which they were 
attached."" In consequence, the Committee recommended 
section two because it "would leave the whole question with the 
Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1981). 
12. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943). 
13. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 226. Ely notices the "distrust of the self-serving 
motives of those in power." JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 136 (1980). Chief Justice Denman observed: "The practice of a 
ruling power in the State is but a feeble proof of its legality." Stockdale v. 
Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1171 (Q.B. 1839). 
14. US. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 2. 
15. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH 
AMENDMENTS 143 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter Avins]. 
16. Id. at 237. 
17. Id. at 94. 
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people of each State."ls Other facts could be set forth; Justice 
Harlan concluded that the evidence is "irrefutable and still 
unan~wered";'~ numerous commentators, among them 
activists, agree that suffrage was excluded from the 
Amendment.20 Indeed, Brest grudgingly conceded that "the 
adopters of the equal protection clause probably intended it not 
to  encompass voting discrimination at all."21 
It is no less clear that segregation was left in place, as 
many commentators agree." Brest acknowledges that "the 
18. Id. 
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
20. Henry J. Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice At Any Cost"? 
The Judicial Role Revisited: Reflections on Government by Judiciary: m e  
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 467-68 
(1979); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: 
Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209, 212 (1964); 
WARD E.Y. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY 127 (1974); Gerald 
Gunther, Too Much a Battle with Straw Men, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1977, at 4; 
MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 66 (1977); Wallace Mendelson, Raoul Berger's 
14th AmendmentAbuse by Contraction vs. Abuse by Expansion, 6 HAsrmGS 
C o ~ s r .  L.Q. 437, 452-53 (1979) (book review); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 
Constitutional Interpretation and the Democratic Process, 56 T M .  L. REV. 579, 581 
(1978) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION F THE 14TH AMENDMENT (1977)). For additional citations, see 
Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 311, 311 n.5 (1979). 
21. Brest 11, supra note 5, a t  234 n.115. As Justice Harlan observed, "general 
statements . . . that the Amendment was designed to achieve equality . . . do not 
weaken the force of the statements specifically addressed to the suffrage question." 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 US. 112, 186 11.54 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Fradshrter vigorously condemned the 
Court's intrusion into regulation of suffrage by its reapportionment decisions: "Such 
a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past in asserting destructively 
novel judicial power demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our 
constitutional scheme." Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
22. Abraham, supra note 20, at 467-68; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS 135 (1991); Larry A. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A 
Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 6 (1981); Dean 
Alfange, Jr., On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at 
the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 W I N G S  CONST. 
L.Q. 603, 606-07, 622 (1978); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEASI' DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 100 (1962); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE P O ~ C A L  
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 75-76 (1990); Brest, supra note 3, at  10; Randall Bridwell, 
Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907, 913 (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY: THE TFWNSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977)); John 
Burleigh, The Supreme Court us. The Constitution, 50 PUB. INTEREST 151, 154 
(1978); 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISI'ORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1179 (1971); Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on 
Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1992); HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S 
C O N ~ T I O N :  HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE 
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nation was not ready to eliminate ['school segregation'] in the 
1860 '~ . '~~  Brest would dismiss the historical proof as an 
attempt to bring "supposed new insights into the adopters' 
intention,"* when the fact is that the historical evidence 
speaks for itself. In light of the facts, Brest's unqualified T h e  
Intentions of the Adopters Are in the Eyes of the Beholder" is a 
canard. 
The interpretive issue is misstated by Brest: "me  text, 
rather than the adopters' subjective states of mind, is the 
primary guide to the purpose of a pro~ision."~~ "Subjective 
relates to  something within the mind, objective to something 
Once a writer expresses his intention, i t  exists 
independently of his "state of mind." A statement is itself a 
fact.27 Brest's quotation of Justice Frankfurter is in accord 
with this analysis: "the legislative aim is evinced in the 
language of the statute, as read in the light of other external 
manifestations of purpose. . . . We are not concerned with 
anything subjective. We do not delve into the mind of 
legislators, or their draftsmen, or committee members."28 Nor 
do originalists engage in psychoanalysis; they rely on objective 
facts-statements. So too, Brest would have it  that originalists 
ask: "How would the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment 
-- 
"CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN CONST~MJTIONALTSM 290 n.70 (1968); RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 689 (1976); Sanford Levinson, The Turn Toward 
Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. D A ~ N  L. REV. 567, 568 (1984); 
Douglas Martin, Yale Chief Opens Constitution Talks by Faulting Meese, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, at 46; Michael J. Perry, Interpretiuism, Freedom of 
Expression and Equal Protection, 42 01110 ST. LJ .  261, 295 n.144 (1981); Richard 
A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV, 1365, 1374-75 (1990); David A.J. 
Richards, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional Theory and the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 25 LOY. LA. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1992); Mark V. Tushnet, Following 
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretiuism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 781, 800 (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 360-61 
(1982). 
23. Brest, supra note 3, at 10, 11. "Negroes were barred from public schools 
of the North, and still widely regarded as 'racially inferior' and 'incapable of 
education.' Even comparatively enlightened leaders then accepted segregation in 
schools." GRAHAM, supra note 22, a t  290 n.70. 
24. Brest I, supra note 1, at  17. 
25. Id. (emphasis added). 
26. FUM( & WAGNALLS, DESK STANDARD ICTIONARY (1944) (emphasis added). 
The word "intent" refers "to an external standard." OLIVER W. H O ~ S ,  THE 
COMMON LAW 107 (1963). 
27. For a more extended discussion of this view, see Raoul Berger, Judicial 
Review: Counter-criticism in Tranquility, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 390, 395-96 (1974). 
28. Brest I, supra note 1, at  19 (emphasis added). 
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have decided . . . Brown v. Board of Edu~ation.'~' Such 
guessing is far from originalist thinking; instead, they found 
that the framers left segregation to State control, as Brest 
re~ognizes,3~ and therefore conclude that Brown overturned 
this purpose. 
To discredit what Brest  denominates "strict 
construction7'-"focusing on the adopters' specific intention7'-he 
invokes Home Building & Loan Ass'n u. Blaisdell~' where the 
majority "upheld a mortgage moratorium during the 
depre~sion."~~ A mortgagee claimed that the M i ~ e s o t a  
statute of 1933, which provided that foreclosures could be 
postponed until May 1935, constituted an impairment of its 
contract. Brest recounts that the dissenters-"the so-called four 
horsemen who did battle against the New Dealn-would "have 
struck down the law . . . under the banner of strict 
~onstruction."~~ This is what Edmund Wilson called "the 'bed- 
fellow' line of argument, which relies on producing the illusion 
of having put you irremediably in the wrong by associating you 
with some odious person who holds . . . a similar ~pinion."~ 
"Guilt by association'' is well enough in the mouth of a 
demagogue, but it is unworthy of one who pretends t o  
scholarship. For as the philosopher Sidney Hook observed, 
"what makes a thing true is not who says it, but the evidence 
for it."35 
In Blaisdell, Chief Justice Hughes disposed of the 
"impairment of contracts" clause on two grounds. The first is 
Marshall's alleged statement that "[wlithout impairing the 
obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be 
modified."36 This, however, is at odds with Marshall's actual 
statements in Sturges: "Any law which releases a part of this 
obligation, must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it. . . . 
The principle [the Framers] intended to establish [was] the 
inviolability of contracts. This principle was to be protected in 
29. Id. at 18. 
30. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
31. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
32. Brest I, supra note 1, at 17-18. 
33. Id. at 18. 
34. EDMUND WILSON, EUROPE WITHOUT A BAEDEKER: S ~ H E S  AMONG THE 
RUINS OF ITALY, GREECE AND ENGLAND, TOGETHER WITH NOTES FROM A EUROPEAN 
DIARY: 1963-64, at 154 (2d ed. 1966). 
35. SIDNEY HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 121 (1980). 
36. Bbisdd ,  290 U.S. at 430 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 US. (4 
Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819)). 
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whatsoever form it might be a~sailed."~' In a recent survey in 
The Constitution in the Supreme Court, David Currie observed 
that "debt extensions in economic crises had been among the 
specific evils the [contract] clause was designed to prevent, and 
the Court had repeatedly struck them down" for "nearly a 
cent~ry."~' Hughes' rationalization, wrote Richard Epstein, 
"contains some of the most misguided thinking on 
Constitutional interpretation i~naginable."~~ 
Hughes' second ground was that the Court is not bound by 
the Founders' conception of the meaning of the clause, citing 
Marshall's "memorable warning": W e  must never forget that 
it is a Constitution we are expounding-a Constitution 
intended . . . to be adapted to the various crises of human 
a.fEair~.'~~ That selfsame Constitution provides for change by 
the people through amendment, not change by the courts. 
McCuUoch merely voiced a plea for some "choice of means" to 
execute an existing power, not t o  alter its meaning." It had 
immediately come under attack, and Marshall leapt to the 
defense saying, "It does not contain the most distant allusion to 
any extension by construction of the powers of congress."42 And 
he specifically declared that judicial review "cannot be the 
assertion of a right t o  change that instrument/43 a 
reaffirmation of Marbury v. Madison's invalidation of Congress' 
attempt to alter the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
37. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197, 200 (1819). 
38. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE C O N ~ T I O N  I  THE SUPREME COUIZT: THE 
SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 211 (1990). Leonard Levy wrote, "The case seemed 
to be exactly the sort for which the [contract] clause had been designed. . . . In 
effect the Court added to the contract clause the words 'except in emergencies.' But 
Hughes pretended that the Court had decided as the Framers would have . . . ." 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMEXB' CONSTITUTION 327-28 
(1988). Lino Graglia considers that Blaisdell "effectively [read] the Contracts Clause 
. . . out of the Constitution." Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constikction: 
Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1031 (1992). 
39. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 703, 735 (1984). 
40. BlaisdeU, 290 U.S. at 443 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819) (emphasis omitted)). 
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408, 415 (1819). 
42. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in JOHN MARSHALL'S 
DEFENSE OF McCulloch u. Maryland 185 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter 
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE]. 
43. Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Ever ready to replace factual analysis with 
a glittering phrase, Brest quotes a remark of Paul Freund: "We ought not to read 
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Brest contends that during its 200-year history the focus of 
constitutional interpretation has been on "text rather than 
 intention^."^^ Yet Chief Justice Marshall wrote that he could 
cite from the common law "the most complete evidence that the 
intention is the most sacred rule of interpret~tion."~~ 
Noticeably absent from Brest's article is any reference to the 
400-year common law history to  which Marshall referredO4' 
Jefferson Powell, an activist critic of original intention, noted 
that the American "victors viewed the 'revolution of 1800' [the 
election of Jefferson] as the people's endorsement of the 
approach to Constitutional interpretation embodied" in the 
doctrine of "original intent."48 "By the outbreak of the Civil 
War," he concluded, "intentionalism in the modem sense 
reigned ~uprerne."~' A few citations to  confirmatory evidence 
should suffice. In 1838 the Supreme Court stated that 
construction "must necessarily depend on the words of the 
Constitution; the meaning and intention of the convention 
which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to 
the conventions . . . in the several states . . . to  which the Court 
has always resorted in construing the Constit~tion."~~ That 
practice was in harmony with the pronouncements of Jefferson 
and Madison. In his inaugural address, Jefferson pledged to  
administer the Constitution "according to  the safe and honest 
meaning contemplated by the plain understanding of the people 
at  the time of its adoption-a meaning to  be found in the 
explanations of those who advocated . . . it."' Madison wrote 
the Constitution like a last will and testament lest it become one." Brest I, supra 
note 1, at  21. The Article V provision for amendment forfends that dread prospect. 
And Freund to the contrary notwithstanding, Justice Story declared that the 
Constitution should have "a fixed, uniform, permanent construction. . . . not 
dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same 
yesterday, to-day and forever." 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
C O N S T ~ I O N  OF THE UNITED STATES 5 426 (5th ed. 1905). 
45. Brest I, supra note 1, at  17. 
46. MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 42, at 167. 
47. See Raoul Berger, "Original Intention* in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to 
Jefferson Powell, 67 TM. L. REV. 1033 (1989). 
48. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 934 (1985). 
49. Id. at 947. 
50. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838). 
51. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONST~~UTION 446 (2d ed. 1836) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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that if "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and 
ratified by the nation . . . be not the guide in expounding it, 
there can be no security for a consistent and stable 
[government], more than for a faithful exercise of its 
powers ."52 
Inasmuch as the great bulk of constitutional litigation 
nowadays arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, it needs to 
be noted that in the 39th Congress a proponent of the 
Amendment, Senator Charles Sumner, stated: "Every 
Constitution embodies the principles of its Framers. It is a 
transcript of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to 
doubt . . . we cannot err if we turn to  the  framer^."^^ To this 
may be added a unanimous January 1872 Report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, signed by senators who had voted for the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, respecting 
a plea for a statutory grant of women's suffrage: 
In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give i t  
such interpretation as will secure the result intended to be 
accomplished by those who framed i t  and the people who 
adopted it. . . . A construction which would give the phrase a 
meaning differing from the sense in which i t  was understood 
and employed by the people when they adopted the 
Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure 
from the plain and express language of the Cons t i t~ t ion .~~ 
Justice Holmes wrote, "Of course, the purpose of written 
instruments is to express some intention or state of mind of 
those who write them, and it is desirable to make that purpose 
effectual."55 Brest himself acknowledges, "it seems strange to 
imagine that the adopters of a provision could intend that 
others might apply it differently than they 
Nevertheless Brest attributes t o  the British legal 
philosopher H.L.A. Hart the view that "adopters m a y  intend to 
52. 9 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1819-1836, at  191 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
53. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866). 
54. Avins, supm note 15, at  571-72. 
55. Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417 (1899), reprinted in OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 206 (1921); 
see also Wirts v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968); United States v. 
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 US. 534, 543-44 (1940); Boston Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tremaine, 
133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943) (L. Hand, J.). 
56. Brest I, supra note 1, a t  19. 
724 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
delegate discretion to subsequent decisionmakers" to override 
the clear legislative intente5? Where was that intention 
expressed? Under American doctrines, legislative power may 
not be transferred to the judiciary." Minimally such a 
delegation calls for clear evidence that such was the 
draftsmen's intention, particularly because the Founders had a 
"profound fear" of judicial d iscre t i~n,~~ of the "judges' 
imposition of their personal views7s0 under the guise of 
interpretation. Of course, words in a legal document "are 
simply delegations to  others . . . [to apply] them to particular 
things or oc~asions."~' Thus "transportation" envisioned by 
oxcart may later comprehend carriage by a plane. This 
exemplifies the application of a principle and is not to be 
confused with its abrogation, e.g., substitution of "one person- 
one vote" for the irrefutable exclusion of suffrage from the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In any event, the framers, as we have noted, meant 
original intention to govern. Brest argues, however, that "a 
choice must be made," and that the adopters "cannot determine 
the But judges may not substitute their choice for 
that of the Framers; t o  do so is to rewrite the Constitution. 
Even a flaming activist, Judge J. Skelly Wright, wrote that the 
Framers have already made the choices, and judges' "value 
choices are to be made only within the parameters" of those 
choices." Writing in 1939, Jacobus tenBroek said that the 
Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that 
the end and object of Constitutional construction is the 
discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the 
instrument ."64 
57. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Hart regarded the vision of judges as 
"legislators" an Englishman's "nightmare." SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN 
MARSHALL 146 (1990). 
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976). 
59. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 
at  298 (1969). 
60. Powell, supra note 48, at  891. 
61. Brest I, supra note 1, at 20 (citing Charles Curtis, A Better Theory of 
Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 422 (1950)). 
62. Id. at 22. 
63. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Dadition, and the 
Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 785 (1971). Brest dismisses the view that 
"choice is [often] based on the justices' personal whim" because they operate 
"against the background of a tradition which constrains these choices." Brest, supra 
note 3, at 22. Compare Justice Black's more realistic evaluation, infra note 89. 
64. Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic 
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Here the law coincides with common sense. Who better 
knows what he means than the writer?--certainly not the 
reader. John Selden, a preeminent seventeenth century scholar, 
stated that "a Man's Writing has but one true Sense, which is 
that which the Author meant when he writ it.'a5 His 
illustrious precursors, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, were of 
the same opinion.66 After a hiatus, the House of Lords 
declared in 1992 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson that "we are 
much more likely to find the intention of Parliament [in its 
proceedings] than anywhere else."? 
It is open to  Brest to differ with the centuries-old practice, 
but it is misleading t o  treat it as a recent heresy, a rejection of 
"well-established precedents under the guise of returning t o  the 
original under~tanding."~ Of the same nature is Brest's 
assertion that originalists "would have the Court reject the 
long-standing series of decisions holding that the Bill of Rights 
applies to  the states through the Fourteenth A~nendment.'"~ 
The incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was "discovered" in 1947 by Justice Black 
dissenting in Adamson v. Calif~rnia.~~ For 135 years, Justices 
Harlan and Stewart reminded the Court, every member agreed 
that the Founders exempted the states from the Bill of 
Rights.?' This, Louis Henkin observed, was "the consistent, 
often reaffirmed, and almost unanimous jurisprudence of the 
Co~rt."'~ What is it that renders the decisions of the last 40 
Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional 
Construction, 27 CAL. L. REV. 399, 399 (1939). 
65. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 
10 (2d ed. 1696). 
66. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN *18: "The judge is to be guided by the Gnal 
causes, for which the law was made . . . the knowledge of which final causes is in 
the legislature." Locke stated, 
when a man speaks to another, it is . . . [to] make known his ideas to 
the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the 
speaker . . . this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is 
limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else. 
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 204-06 
(Raymond Wilburn ed., 1942). 
67. Pepper v. Hart, 3 W.L.R. 1032, 1057 (1992) (citations omitted). 
68. Brest I, supra note 1, at 23 (emphasis added). 
69. Id. (emphasis added). 
70. 332 US. 46, 80-90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
71. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
72. Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 
YALE LJ .  74, 76 (1963). 
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years sacrosanct whereas the Warren Court toppled those of 
the prior 135 years like dominoes?73 Brest, who evinces no 
compunction in jettisoning the basic principle of our democratic 
system-government by consent of the governed-is aghast 
that the Warren Court decisions should be questioned. Why 
must we be bound by the "dead hand" of Earl Warren? Activist 
theology, to borrow from Mark Tushnet, is "plainly designed to 
protect the legacy of the Warren C~urt ."?~ 
To bolster his contention that it is "obviously impossible to 
describe [the] specific intentions" of the "multitudes of people" 
engaged in the "drafting and ratifying of the Constitution," 
Brest again invokes Frankfurter, who avoided speaking of 
"legislative intent."75 But Frankfurter read a statute "in the 
light of other external manifestations of purpose."76 
Originalists would agree that "[wle are not concerned with . . . 
delv[ing] into the mind of legislators or their draftsmen, or 
committee members.'"? But Justice Frankfurter stated, "It has 
never been questioned in this Court that committee reports, as 
well as statements by those in charge of a bill or of a report, 
are authoritative elucidations of the scope of a measure."78 
Our representative form of government postulates, moreover, 
that the people speak through the voice of their delegates. 
Obviously, a nation of many millions cannot act by a monster 
town-meeting. Lincoln considered that the Framers "fairly 
represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at 
that time."7g Jefferson found the meaning of the people in the 
explanations of those who advocated adoption of the 
73. "The list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a table of 
contents from an old constitutional law casebook." PHlW B. KURLAND, PoLJ!~'Ics, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970). The "result-oriented 
jurisprudence" of the Warren Court "witnessed the crumbling of sometimes century- 
old precedents and the charting of new political and social goals." Stanley I. 
Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical?, 6 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 514 (1979) (book review). 
74. Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structuml Review and Prophecy, 8 U .  
DAYTON L. REV. 809, 811 (1983). 
75. Brest I, supra note 1, at  19. 
76. Id. (citing Felix Frankfurter, Some RefEections on the Reading of Statutes, 
1947 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538-39 (1947)). 
77. Id. 
78. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 399-400 
(195 1) (Franbfurter, J., dissenting). 
79. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27, 
1860), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at  111 (1989). 
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Constituti~n.~~ Of the 1866 period, Morton Keller found that 
"most congressional Republicans were aware of (and shared) 
their constituents' hostility to black s~ffrage."~' Chief Justice 
Thomas Cooley, a contemporary of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
wrote that "we are endeavoring to  arrive at the intent of the 
people through the discussions and deliberations of their 
repre~entatives.''~~ Brest's argument is a rehash of that made 
by tenBroek in 1939. Unmoved thereby, the courts have 
continued to  cite legislative history. 
In the same vein, Brest urges that what was adopted "is 
not a set of intentions but a set of In 1787 the Anti- 
Federalists played on the fears aroused by the text of the 
Constitution; to  allay such fears the Federalists represented 
that those terms were more restricted than was paintedeS4 
Thus it was not merely the text that was adopted, but the text 
as explained by its proponents. Now to repudiate those 
representations is, as Justice Story declared in similar context, 
t o  commit a "fraud upon the whole American pe~ple."'~ 
Arguing for broad judicial discretion in construing 
"imprecise" terms, Brest cites Justice Frankfurter's statement, 
"Great concepts like . . . 'due process of law' . . . were purposely 
left to  gather meaning from e~perience.'"~ History is to  the 
80. Supra text accompanying note 51. 
81. MORTON KELCER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 67 (1977). "[Nlational enfranchisement 
of the Negro - which meant Negro voting in the North - was out of the question." 
WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 32 (1965). The "most significant decisions of the [the 
Warren] Court overturned legislation that substantial local, and probably national, 
majorities supported both in theory . . . and in practice." Mark V. Tushnet, 
Dialects of Legal Histog, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (1979) (reviewing G. EDWARD 
WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1978)). 
82. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 102 
(7th ed. 1903). 
83. Brest I, supra note 1, at  20. 
84. Hamilton met Brutus' gloomy prognostications with the assertion that "the 
judiciary is next to nothing." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). 
85. "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief sedulously cultivated on 
all sides that such protection was afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the 
whole people to give it a different construction to its powers . . .?" 2 Story, supra 
note 44, at 8 1084. 
86. Brest I, supra note 1, at  21. An apostle of judicial self-restraint, 
Frankfurter yet "played a pivotal role" in the overthrow of segregated schools, 
JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 85 (1975), 
notwithstanding that his law clerk, Alexander Bickel, who at his request had 
studied the debates of the 39th Congress, advised him that "it is impossible to 
conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible 
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contrary. On the eve of the Convention, Hamilton declared, 
"The words 'due process' have a precise technical import, and 
are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts 
of justice; they can never be referred to an act of 
legislature.'"' It is the legislature, not the courts, to whom 
was confided "the whole domain of social and economic fact."" 
Charles Curtis, whom Brest eulogizes, wrote that the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause "was as firred 
and definite as the common law could make a phrase. . . . It 
meant a procedural pr~cess . ' '~~ And he asked, "But who made 
it a large generality? Not they [the Founders]. We [the Court] 
did.'*' Frankfurter himself once shared that view, writing in 
1925 that the contents of the Due Process Clauses "are derived 
from the disposition of the Justices.'*' I t  is a long-established 
also to conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the language they were 
adopting," RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1976). In less pressurized 
circumstances, Frankfurter declared that "an amendment to the Constitution should 
be read in a 'sense most obvious to the common understanding at  the time of its 
adoption." Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). Again, "very specific provisions" such as a prohibition against ''bills of 
attainder" must be read as "defined by history." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303, 321 (1946). "Their meaning was so settled by history that definition was 
superfluous." Id. The meaning of "due process" was at least as firmy settled. Later 
he wrote, "Legal doctrines . . . derive meaning and content from the circumstances 
that gave rise to them and from the purposes they were designed to serve. To 
these they are bound as is a live tree to its roots." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He acknowledged that the (alleged) "vagueness" 
of due process "readily lends itself to make of the Court a third chamber with 
drastic veto power." Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 229 (1955). Earlier he had written that by means of the 
Due Process Clause the Supreme Court was "putting constitutional compulsion 
behind the private judgment of its members upon disputed and difficult questions 
of social policy." KURLAND, supra note 73, at xiv. 
87. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. 
Cooke eds., 1962). For Hamilton's summarization of the common law, see Raoul 
Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
88. Brest I, supra note 1, at 21. 
89. Charles Curtis, Review and Majori6y Ruk, in THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SUPREME LAW 170, 177 (Edmund Cahn ed., 1954). Compare with this Frankfurter's 
statement that due process is of "convenient vagueness" so that the "Court is 
compelled to put meaning in the Constitution." F E ~  FRANKmJWrEFt, MR. J U ~ C E  
HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 7 (1938). Justice Black more truly declared, 
"there is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the Due h s s  
Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the 
Constitution as written so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which 
a majority of the Court at  any given time believes are needed to meet present-day 
problems." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663, 675-76 (1966) (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
90. Curtis, supra note 89, at 177. 
91. ~EJCANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
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canon that when the draftsmen employ common law terms, the 
common law "definitions," as Justice Story put it, "are 
necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text.'@2 
The words "due process," the Court stated, were used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment "in the same sense and with no greater 
extent" than in the Fifth Amend~nent.~~ In sum, to borrow 
from Edward Corwin, "no one at the time of the framing and 
adoption of the Constitution had any idea that this clause did 
more than consecrate a method of procedure against accused 
persons, and the modern doctrine of due process of law . . . 
could never have been laid down except in defiance of 
history."s4 
We should not leave so-called "general terms" without 
some reference to  "equal protection of the law," first met in 
1866. John Hart Ely considers the words "ins~rutable.'*~ Brest 
25 (1978). 
92. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). Chief Justice 
Marshall stated that if a word was understood in a certain sense "when the 
constitution was framed. . . . The Convention must have used the word in that 
sense . . . ." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). This was the 
common law rule: "If a statute make use of a Word the Meaning of which is well 
known at the Common Law, such Word shall be taken in the same Sense it was 
understood at the Common Law." 4 MAITHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE 
LAW "Statute" I(4) (1786). The Court noted that the lawyers in the Convention 
expressed their conclusions "in terms of the common law, confident that they could 
be shortly and easily understood." Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925). 
Brest's argument that "it simply cannot be assumed that the laymen in the 
convention used a "phrase in its technical sense," Brest I, supra note 1, at 27-29, 
"simply" betrays unfamiliarity with the settled practice. 
Brest understands full well that the original meaning of constitutional terms is 
to  be given effect: 
[Sluppose that the Constitution provided that some ads  were to be 
performed "biweekly." At the time of the framing of the Constitution, this 
meant only "once every two weeks"; but modern dictionaries . . . now 
report "twice a week." To construe the provision now to mean 
"semiweekly" would certainly be a change of meaning (and an improper 
one at  that). 
PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTWUTIONAL DECISION MAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 146 n.38 (1975). 
93. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). 
94. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY 
OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 118-19 (1934). In 1970 the Court recalled the 
"era when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike 
down state laws 'because they may be unwise.' . . . That era has long ago passed 
into history." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970); see also Ferguson 
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
95. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
98 (1980). Wallace Mendelson regards the words as so broad as to be almost 
meaningless. Mendelson, supra note 20, at 451. 
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comments that "because of its indeterminacy, the clause does 
not offer much guidance even in resolving particular issues of 
discrimination based on race.'@6 To invalidate a statute under 
cover of an "indeterminate clause" is t o  subvert the 
Constitution. Federal supervision of state action, said Justice 
Brandeis on behalf of the Court, "is in no case permissible 
except as to  matters by the Constitution specifically authorized 
or delegated to the United States.'@' Federal interference, 
"except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the 
State."98 Given the grudging, jealous surrender by the states 
of limited jurisdiction to the federal govern~nent?~ it should 
not lightly be assumed that the states have consented by an 
"indeterminate clause" to curtailment of the sovereignty they 
were at pains to reserve. 
Of a certainty the Equal Protection Clause is not 
boundless, for the framers excluded suffrage and segregation; 
and they repeatedly rejected proposals to ban al l  
discrimination.lw This is precisely the sort of situation in 
which Senator Sumner counselled resort to  the framers' 
 explanation^.'^' But that does not cross Brest's mind. For 
him, in interpreting a clause "as broad as the equal protection 
clause, one must posit a theory or principle for the clause."102 
A page of history, however, is worth a volume of theorizing.lo3 
The "starting point7' in construction of a clause "as broad as the 
equal protection clause," he remarks, should be "our 
understanding of the adopters' purposes."104 He confines 
himself to speculation about the four classes to  which the 
clause might apply.lo5 The framers, however, were 
preoccupied with protection of a particular class-the 
emancipated negroes; they were almost exclusively concerned 
96. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 232. 
97. Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64, 79 (1938) (emphasis added); see also 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325 (1816). 
98. Erie, 304 U.S. at  79. 
99. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 78-79, 171-73 (1987). 
100. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 163-64 (1977). 
101. Supra text accompanying note 53. 
102. Brest I, supra note 1, a t  21 (emphasis added). 
103. "History, to most authors of the Constitution, was more valuable than 
political theory-because it was more real." FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HIS~ORY 67 (1994). 
104104. Brest I, supra note 1, at  21. 
105. Id. 
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with the content of equal protection, with what rights were to 
be protected. 
Let me encapsulate the facts. Northern outrage had been 
ignited by the Black Codes which, as Senator Henry Wilson put 
it, "practically make slaves of men we have declared to  be 
free."'" In response, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited 
discrimination with respect to the right to  own property, to 
contract, and to have access to  the courts,lo7 rights designed 
to  enable the liberated slaves to exist. After reviewing the 
legislative history the Court concluded in 1966 that the Act 
conferred a "limited category of rights."lo8 The Fourteenth 
Amendment, regarded without demur as "identical" with the 
Act, and designed to embody it and thus secure it against 
repeal,log substituted for the negative ban of discrimination 
the positive equal protection. Their affinity was disclosed by 
the explanation of Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio that the Civil 
Rights Bill secures "equality of protection in those enumerated 
civil rights which the States may deem proper to confer upon 
any races."l1° Leonard Myers of Pennsylvania explained that 
the Amendment required that each state shall provide for 
"equal protection to life, liberty, and property, equal rights to  
sue and be sued, to inherit, make contracts, and give 
testimony,""' virtually a reprise . of Shellabarger's 
explanation. Both Shellabarger and Myers allied equal 
protection to  an enumerated and "limited category" of rights. 
While Senator James Patterson of New Hampshire was 
"opposed to any law discriminating against [blacks] in the 
security and protection of life, liberty, person, property, and the 
proceeds of their labor'' he emphasized that "[bleyond this I am 
not prepared to  go."ll2 The reason is not far to  seek. David 
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1866). Senator William Stewart 
stated that the Civil Rights Bill was designed "simply to remove the disabilities 
existing by laws tending to reduce the negro to a system of peonage." Avins, supra 
note 15, at  204. 
107. Avins, supra note 15, at 121. 
108. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966). 
109. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Response to Michael 
Zuckert, 26 GA. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1991). Justice Bradley, a contemporary of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, declared that the "first section of the bill covers the same 
ground as the fourteenth amendment." Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. 
Crescent City Live-stack Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 
(C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408). 
110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866) (emphasis added). 
111. Avins, supra note 15, at 193. 
112. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866). 
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Donald, a Reconstruction historian, observed that the 
suggestion that "Negroes should be treated as equals to white 
men awoke some of the deepest and ugliest fears in the 
American mind."113 George Julian noted that "we hate the 
Negro," a sentiment voiced by others.ll4 Vann Woodward 
found that popular convictions were not prepared to sustain "a 
guarantee of eq~ality.""~ This was acknowledged by two 
leaders, Thaddeus Stevens and Senator William Fessenden. 
Towards the end of the debates, Stevens exclaimed that he had 
hoped that the people "would have so remodelled our 
institutions as to have freed them from every vestige of . . . 
inequality of rights . . . that no distinction would be 
tolerated. . . . This bright dream has vanished. . . . [Wle shall 
be obliged to  be content with patching up the worst portions of 
the ancient edifi~e.""~ So too, Fessenden recognized that 'We 
cannot put into the Constitution, owing to  existing prejudices 
and existing institutions [racism and States rights], an entire 
exclusion of all class  distinction^."^^' Whatever the scope of 
equal protection, the two "achievements" of the Warren 
Court--desegregation and suffrage-were excluded. No amount 
of theorizing can wipe out these facts. 
Brest maintains, however, that "our traditions are quite 
re~ilient.""~ But Justice Holrnes said on behalf of the Court, 
"If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by 
common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth 
Amendment to affect it."'l9 True it is that under the Warren- 
Brennan-Thurgood Marshall axis, tradition was made 
"resilient7'-a euphemism for wholesale jettisoning of precedent 
and of judicial revision of the Constitution. It is no answer that 
Justice Harlan said that our Constitutional tradition is a 
'living" one.lzO More closely in point is his reproach that 
"[wlhen the Court disregards the express intent and 
understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the 
political proc&s to  which the amending power was committed, 
and it has violated the Constitutional structure which is its 
DAVID DONALD, CHARLES UMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 156-57 (1970). 
BERGER, supra note 99, at 13. 
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SLAVERY 83 (1960). 
Avins, supm note 15, at 237. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866) (emphasis added). 
Brest I, supra note 1, at 22. 
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). 
Brest I, supra note 1, at 22. 
7 151 AN ANATOMY OF FALSE ANALYSIS 733 
highest duty to  protect."12' There in a nutshell is orighalist 
doctrine. 
Today a fashionable analytical tool is "levels of generality," 
in Brest's words, "On what level of generality should an 
interpreter try to  ascertain and apply the adopters' 
 intention^?"'^^ Robert Bork notes that a judge "can 
manipulate the levels of generality at  which he states the 
Framers' principles."'* Some "principles," e.g. the exclusion 
of suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment, so clearly reflect 
the framers' intention that t o  manipulate this incontrovertible 
exclusion would be subversive. Chief Justice Warren's 
derivation of "one person-one vote" from the Fourteenth 
Amendmentla is not an instance of the manipulation of 
levels of generality, but rather exemplifies raw fiat. 
"[A]bstractions," wrote Jacques Barzun, "form a ladder which 
takes the climber into the clouds, where diagnostic differences 
disappear."'* He adds that "at a high enough rung on the 
ladder of abstraction, disparate things become the same: a song 
and a spinning top are, after all, but two ways of setting air 
waves in motion."'" Resorting to  levels of generality is 
merely a device to escape from the bonds of the particulars. 
Concretely, Mark Tushnet asks, "why describe the concept of 
equality on a level of generality so high that it obliterates the 
specific intention to permit ~egregation?"'~' More importantly, 
when a judge ascends to high levels of generality, Bork 
observes, "he creates a concept without limits ,"la thereby 
violating the Founders' purpose to  limit the delegated 
powers.lm 
A prime duty of a scholar is to  take account of discrepant 
evidence? Brest resolutely turns his back on facts which 
121. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 US. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
122. Brest I, supra note 1, at 18. 
123. Robert Bork, Foreword to GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE CONSITPUTION AND 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY at xi (1985). 
124. Reynolds v. Sirns, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 576 (1964). 
125. JACQUES BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WIU~AM JAMES 59 (1983). 
126. Id. at 65. 
127. Mark V. Tushnet, FoUou,ing the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1983). 
128. Bork, supm note 123, at x. 
129. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
130. HERBEW BUITERFIELD, GEORGE IU AND THE H I ~ R I A N S  225 (David 
Cannadine ed., Cassell Publishers Ltd. 1988) (1957). 
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puncture his theorizing. He never really attempts to meet the 
case for the opposition. Is the "irrefutable and unanswered" 
exclusion of suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment merely 
"In the Eyes of the Beholder?" Brest's neglect to meet such 
evidence exhibits a failure to live up to Thomas Huxley's 
standard for scientific inquiry: "[Mly colleagues have learned to  
respect nothing but evidence, and to  believe that their highest 
duty lies in submitting to it, however it may jar against their 
 inclination^."'^^ 
- - 
131. HOMER W. SMITH, MAN AND HIS GODS 372 (1953) (citation omitted). 
